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ABSTRACT 
In the last two decades, a renewed interest about the 
influence of financial factors on a firm’s capital 
investment decision emerged. In fact, theoretical 
developments that occurred in the field of information 
economics, which emphasised the existence of 
information problems in financial markets, allowed to 
rationalise a close relationship between financial factors 
and investment expenses of firms. 
This paper aims at contributing to the empirical 
literature on this subject, presenting the results of an 
empirical study undertaken for a panel of Portuguese 
manufacturing firms. The results obtained suggest that 
the impact of financial factors on investment decisions 
of firms is greater for those facing higher information 
problems in financial markets, such as: small, young and 
low retention firms. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
According to the investment models that assume perfect 
capital markets (e.g. the neoclassical model of 
Jorgenson, 1963, and the Q-model of Tobin, 1969), the 
availability of internal funds does not affect investment 
decisions. Investment outlays in each period are 
determined in perfectly functioning capital markets. 
Financial factors are only considered in the cost of 
capital, which, in turn, is independent of the way in 
which the firm finances itself. This independence 
derives from the assumption that capital markets are 
perfect. Thus, firms can obtain all financing that they 
need to implement investment projects, providing that 
the expected marginal return exceeds the cost of capital. 
In other words, it would not be expected that a company, 
with a profitable investment opportunity but an 
investment outlay greater than its available funds, would 
invest less than a company with the same investment 
opportunities but with greater cash flow. Any 
insufficiency will attract finance in capital markets as 
investors attempt to explore the profit opportunity. This 
also means that the marginal costs of financing through 
debt, external equity capital and internal funds are the 
same. 
In this context, it could be argued that the availability of 
adequate cash flows is not a restriction on investment 
and that the financial structure of firms does not affect 
the cost of capital. 
By contrast, the financing constraints model is based, 
primarily, on the assumption that capital markets are not 
perfect. In this case, the decision about the sources of 
finance become extremely important, since the cost of 
internal funds may diverge significantly from that of 
external funds. According to Myers (1984), a hierarchy 
of finance is created, in which the firm starts by using 
the cheaper funds, i.e. firstly it will use internal funds, 
secondly debt and, finally, new equity capital. 
Therefore, when a company has to decide about its 
investment expenses, it should consider not only the real 
aspects of the investment decision (e.g. the output, the 
relative price of inputs, or technology), but also the 
financial aspects, namely, the generated cash flows and 
the level of internal funds, so that the company does not 
forego valuable investment opportunities. 
The designation of this model as the financing onstraints 
model comes from the basic assumption that, at least, 
some firms can face financial restrictions. One can say 
that there are financial restrictions when a company 
cannot obtain all the amount of finance it needs, 
irrespective of the opportunity cost of funds. In other 
words, financial restrictions refer to the situation in 
which profitable investment projects, that would be 
undertaken if there were sufficient internal funds in the 
firm, would be abandoned since the availability of 
external funds for the company is limited, due to (i) 
information imperfections in capital markets, and (ii) to 
the fact that the cost of external funds is greater than that 
of internal funds (Kim, 1999). 
It should be emphasised that the idea of including 
financial variables in an econometric investment 
equation is not new. The models that integrated these 
variables assumed great importance in the 1950’s. 
However, three fundamental reasons justify their 
abandonment. Firstly, the ad hoc manner in which these 
variables were included in the econometric investment 
equations. Secondly, the famous proposition 1 of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958), which provided the 
  
 
theoretical foundations required to consider only the real 
aspects of the investment decision. Thirdly, the 
empirical results obtained by using these models in 
comparison with more consistent theoretical ones were 
poor. 
The recent resurgence of investment models that include 
financial factors is due to two main reasons. The first 
one is related to the emergence of a new theoretical 
body that flourished since the 1970’s, that emphasises 
the role played by information problems in financial 
markets. These are related, on the one hand, to the 
existence of asymmetric information in financial 
markets, which leads to adverse selection problems and 
moral hazard, as the works of Akerlof (1970), Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981), Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss (1984) 
and Myers and Majluf (1984) demonstrated, and, on the 
other hand, to agency problems as stressed by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986). 
The second reason derives from the pioneer empirical 
study of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988). Their 
empirical research was of great importance for two main 
reasons. Firstly, these authors emphasise the use of firm-
level panel data, which allows obtaining pure 
microeconomic results, therefore increasing the 
knowledge on how firms make decisions. Secondly, they 
abandon the assumption of a representative firm, which 
was common in the previous studies on the determinants 
of investment behaviour of firms. A drawback of this 
procedure is that it does not allow to test whether the 
sensitivity of investment to cash flows differ according 
to different types of firms. Consequently, Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen (1988) argue that when the 
objective is to test the validity of the financial 
restrictions model it is necessary to identify, a priori, the 
type of firms that are included in the sample, i.e. to 
identify the firms that are more and less subject to 
information problems in financial markets and, as such, 
the firms that face a higher differential in the costs of 
internal and external funds. 
In brief, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) proposed 
a new methodology for evaluating the impact of 
financial factors on investment decisions of firms. In 
fact, the basic contribution of the financing constraints 
model can be stated as follows. Although some kinds of 
firms can easily obtain external funds to smoothen their 
investment expenses when internal funds fluctuate, the 
time and the amount of capital outlays of other firms, 
with limited or with no access to external funds, will 
likely be conditioned by fluctuations in internal funds. 
This fact may give rise to a situation of under investment 
of firms. 
To test this prediction Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 
(1988) proposed a new methodology, which can be 
described as follows. Firstly, a sample of firms is 
divided into two sub-samples, according to how much 
firms are affected by information problems in capital 
markets, and thus more subject to financial restrictions. 
Secondly, to verify if there are systematic differences in 
the values obtained for the coefficients on financial 
variables, an econometric investment equation is 
estimated for each sub-sample, and the results obtained 
for the coefficients compared. 
The predictions of the financing constraints model has 
been empirically confirmed by several studies for 
different countries. A significant number of these studies 
relate to the case of the US economy. Some examples 
are: Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988); Whited 
(1992); Oliner and Rudebusch (1992); Fazzari and 
Petersen (1993); Vogt (1994); Ramirez (1995); Gilchrist 
and Himmelberg (1995); Chirinko and Schaller (1995); 
Calomiris and Hubbard (1995); Hubbard, Kashyap and 
Whited (1995); Lamont (1997); Stanca and Gallegati 
(1999); Carpenter and Petersen (2002). 
There is, also, wide empirical evidence on the excess 
sensitivity of investment to cash flows in several 
European countries , e.g. Bond and Meghir (1994); 
Fohlin (1998); Deloof (1998); Palenzuela and Iturriaga 
(1998); Vermeulen (2002); Goergen and Renneboog 
(2001); Bo, Lensink and Sterken (2003); Bond, Elston, 
Mairesse and Mulkay (2003); Guariglia (2004); Mizen 
and Vermeulen (2004). 
Finally, more empirical evidence in other countries such 
as Japan [Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991)]; 
Canada [Schaller (1993)]; Mexico [Gelos and Werner 
(2002)]; South Korea [Shin and Park (1999), and Kim 
(1999)]; and Autralia [Mills, Morling and Tease (1995)] 
can be found. 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the empirical 
literature on the determinants of capital investment 
decisions of firms by presenting the results obtained 
from a sample of Portuguese manufacturing firms. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In 
Section 2 the hypothesis to be tested are set. Section 3 
describes the sample and the variables used. Section 4 
identify the criteria used for classifying firms. Section 5 
presents the specification adopted for the econometric 
investment equation. In Section 6 the estimation results 
are shown. Finally, Section 7 draws the main 
conclusions, emphasizing the policy implications of the 
results obtained. 
 
HYPOTHESIS UNDER TEST 
To evaluate the impact of cash flows on investment 
decisions of firms, the methodology proposed initially 
by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) was adopted. 
In this study two key hypothesis are tested. Firstly, the 
aim is to verify whether investment decisions of firms 
are affected by cash flows. This fact may derive as a 
result of a non-perfect substitutability among the 
different sources of funds that a firm can access, that is, 
internal funds, debt, and new equity capital. If this is the 
case, the financial structure of a firm is relevant, which 
implies that investment and financial decisions are not 
independent. So, one can conclude that internal funds 
  
 
are, apart from real variables, an important determinant 
of business fixed investment. 
Secondly, the aim is to test whether the impact of cash 
flows differs from firm to firm. That is, to determine the 
extent to which the effect of cash flows on investment 
decisions of firms is more important for those identified, 
a priori, as suffering more from information problems in 
capital markets and, consequently, where the differential 
between the costs of internal and external funds are 
higher, thus contributing for the existence of financial 
restrictions. Hence, the more a firm is exposed to 
finance constraints the more its investment decisions 
should be determined by the availability of internal 
funds. 
 
DATA AND VARIABLES 
In the empirical study undertaken, a panel data was used 
to obtain empirical evidence on whether firms belonging 
to the Portuguese manufacturing sector face financial 
restrictions. 
The sample used in this study, comprised, initially, 
about 8090 firms, for a period between 1990 and 2000. 
This data came from the Central de Balanços do Banco 
de Portugal. 
Since a balanced panel data was used, firms had to 
respect several criteria to be included in the sample. 
Firstly, only private firms, belonging to the 
manufacturing sector, with at least 25 employees, were 
considered. Secondly, only companies that presented 
values for all variables and for every year of the period 
considered were selected. As a result, the final sample 
comprised a total of 714 firms. 
As far as the variables used were concerned, they were 
computed from the accounting data of the firms selected, 
and can be described as follows: 
• Investment (I): acquisitions of new structures and 
equipments. 
• Stock of capital (K): represented by fixed assets. 
• Sales (S): total sales of the firm. 
• Cash flow (CF): given by the sum of profits and 
depreciation. 
• Working capital (WC): current assets minus current 
liabilities. 
• Debt (LTD): correspond to the medium- and long-term 
debt of the firm. 
 
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics of the firms in 
the sample. The most relevant features are the following. 
Firstly, the mean value of the fixed assets held by firms 
was € 3,311,994. Secondly, the mean value of the 
investment in fixed assets was  € 699,019, whilst the 
mean value of the investment in working capital was € 
131,562. Thirdly, the mean rate of investment in fixed 
assets was 33%, whilst the mean rate of investment in 
working capital was 7%. Finally, sales represented, on 
average, six times the value of fixed assets of the firms 
considered. 
 
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics for firms of the full 
sample. Number of observations 7140. 
Variables 
Full Sample 
Mean S. D. 
K  (€) 3,311,994 6,308,335 
I  (€) 699,019 1,659,003 
WC  (€) 131,562 2,748,804 
It/Kt-1 0.331 0.563 
WCt/Kt-1 0.068 1.195 
St/Kt-1 6.276 8.187 
CFt/Kt-1 0.365 0.623 
WCt-1/Kt-1 1.143 2.674 
LTDt-1/Kt-1 0.033 0.516 
 
CRITERIA FOR SPLITTING THE SAMPLE 
In this subsection the criteria used to identify firms that 
face greater financial restrictions, due to information 
problems in capital markets are described. 
Size 
The first criterion used to split firms into two groups 
was the firms’ size (a group of large firms and a group 
of small firms), where size was measured by firms’ 
sales. 
According to this criterion, it is assumed that large firms 
are, a priori, less subject to financial restrictions. 
The decision to split the sample according to size can be 
justified as follows. Firstly, larger companies have an 
easier access to capital markets, due to the possibility of 
using the firm’s assets as collateral. Secondly, it is likely 
that transaction and floatation costs for new share or 
bond issues decrease with dimension. Thirdly, larger 
companies can use more different sources of funds than 
small companies, which allow large companies to reduce 
the risk of financing. Fourthly, larger companies have, in 
general, to meet more obligations in terms of financial 
statements produced and information released about 
their activities and future prospects.  Finally, it is likely 
that small firms suffer more from the idiosyncratic type 
of risk. 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for both types of 
firms, large and small. By comparing the figures for 
both types of firms, the following conclusions can be 
drawn. Firstly, the mean values of fixed assets, of 
investment in fixed assets and of investment in working 
capital are nine, eight, and eleven times greater for large 
firms than for small firms, respectively. Clearly, this fact 
shows how different the firms included in each group 
are. 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics for firms classified 
according with size. Number of observations 3570. 
Variables 
Large Firms Small Firms 
Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
K  (€) 5,957,508 8,067,413 666,479 718,849 
I  (€) 1,238,918 2,203,110 159,119 261,752 
WC  (€) 240,486 3,873,230 22,637 297,184 
It/Kt-1 0.292 0.361 0.370 0.709 
WCt/Kt-1 0.042 0.599 0.093 1.580 
St/Kt-1 5.454 5.601 7.098 10.067 
CFt/Kt-1 0.338 0.445 0.393 0.760 
WCt-1/Kt-1 0.851 1.499 1.435 3.448 
LTDt-
1/Kt-1 
0.036 0.514 0.030 0.518 
 
Secondly, the mean rate of investment in fixed assets 
and the mean rate of investment in working capital are 
greater for small firms than for large firms (37% vs. 
29% e 9% vs. 4%, respectively). 
Finally, the proportion of the mean value of sales on the 
mean value of fixed assets is greater for small firms than 
for large firms. 
 
Age 
The second criterion used to divide firms into two 
groups was the firms’ age (a group of mature firms and a 
group of young firms). 
It is assumed that mature firms are less likely to face 
information problems in capital markets for: (a) 
creditors have, in general, more information about 
mature firms, since they have been visible for a longer 
period of time, and (b) mature firms can establish 
continued relationships with creditors and suppliers 
based on mutual confidence, which helps to overcome 
information problems. 
In Table 3 some descriptive statistics are presented for 
both types of firms, mature and young. 
 
Table 3 – Descriptive statistics for firms classified 
according with age. Number of observations 3570. 
Variables Mature Firms Young Firms 
 Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
K  (€) 4,583,178 7,917,781 2,040,809 3,698,288 
I  (€) 936,291 2,137,560 461,746 907,503 
WC  (€) 138,967 3,533,964 124,157 1,620,172 
It/Kt-1 0.309 0.579 0.353 0547 
WCt/Kt-1 0.062 1.309 0.073 8.742 
St/Kt-1 5.835 7.337 6.716 8.936 
CFt/Kt-1 0.345 0.588 0.386 0.655 
WCt-1/Kt-1 1.375 3.107 0.911 2.132 
LTDt-
1/Kt-1 
0.026 0.621 0.040 0.384 
 
Table 3 shows that mature firms have mean values for 
fixed assets and for investment in fixed assets that are 
twice as great as those of young firms. This is an 
indication that mature firms tend to be greater than 
young firms. However, this effect tends to be 
counterbalanced, since young firms show a mean rate of 
investment in fixed assets higher than mature firms 
(35,3% vs. 30,9%). 
It is also important to point out that the mean values for 
investment in working capital, rate of investment in 
working capital and the proportion of sales on the stock 
of fixed assets, are similar in the two groups of firms. 
 
Retention ratio 
The last criterion used to classify firms was the profits 
retention ratio. Hence, there is a group that includes 
firms with the lowest retention ratio and another 
composed by firms that have the highest retention ratios. 
The basic assumption for having used this criterion was 
that the availability of internal funds can restrict the 
investment expenses of firms with higher retention ratio. 
Two reasons justify this rationale, according to Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen (1988). On one hand, firms may 
need funds to finance an amount of investment that 
exceeds their cash flow. So, they opt to retain all internal 
funds at low cost, which they generated from their 
normal activity. On the other hand, since dividend 
payments and investment outlays correspond to 
alternative uses of funds, companies that face severe 
restrictions in obtaining finance should choose low 
dividend payouts. 
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics for both types of 
firms, lower and higher profit retention ratios 
companies. 
 
Table 4 – Descriptive statistics for firms classified 
according with retention practices. Number of 
observations 3570. 
Variables 
Low Retention Firms High Retention Firms 
Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
K  (€) 4,046,521 7,194,304 2,577,466 5,173,388 
I  (€) 794,617 1,840,733 603,421 1,448,714 
WC  (€) 139,043 3,095,253 124,081 2,352,289 
It/Kt-1 0.304 0.569 0.359 0557 
WCt/Kt-1 0.043 1.297 0.093 1.084 
St/Kt-1 5.526 7.039 7.025 9.132 
CFt/Kt-1 0.337 0.643 0.393 0.601 
WCt-1/Kt-1 1.077 2.503 1.208 2.834 
LTDt-
1/Kt-1 
0.029 0.492 0.037 0.540 
 
The main features are the following. Firstly, companies 
with a low retention ratio tend to be larger, since they 
have a mean value for the stock of fixed assets higher 
than their counterparts (€ 4,046,521 vs. € 2,577,466). 
However, the mean values of investment in fixed assets 
and working capital, although higher for low retention 
firms, do not differ much in both types of firms. On the 
other hand, the mean rates of investment in fixed assets 
and in working capital are higher for high retention 
firms. 
 
  
 
SPECIFICATION OF THE ECONOMETRIC 
INVESTMENT EQUATION 
To test the two hypothesis set forth at the beginning of 
this section, an econometric investment equation was 
estimated, based on the specification proposed by 
Fazzari and Petersen (1993). 
The basic idea of this model focuses on the role that 
working capital may perform in an investment equation, 
given the possibility that, in some cases, it corresponds 
to the use of funds and, in other cases, to a source of 
funds. 
The argument, developed by Fazzari and Petersen 
(1993), is as follows: (a) if firms face restrictions in 
accessing funds for finance, (b) if fixed investment is 
relatively irreversible, and (c) if firms want to maintain 
unchanged their fixed investment, then the two kinds of 
investment (in fixed and working capital) compete for 
obtaining finance, due to information problems in 
capital markets. Hence, it would be expected a negative 
relationship between fixed investment and working 
capital investment, since firms use working capital  to 
smooth there fixed investment.  
Thus, the specification adopted for the econometric 
investment equation was the following: 
 
Iit/Kit-1= i + t + 1(Sit/Kit-1) + 2(CFit/Kit-1) + 
3(WCit/Kit-1) + 4(LTDit/Kit-1) + it 
 
where I represents firm investment in fixed assets; S 
corresponds to sales; CF is cash flow; WC represents 
change in working capital; and LTD is the change in 
medium- and long-term debt of the firm. All variables 
are divided by the stock of capital (K) to address the 
problem of heteroscedasticity. (i) corresponds to the 
firm effect, (t) to the year effect and (it) is the error 
term. The subscripts i and t correspond to firm and time, 
respectively. 
The inclusion of the variable sales serves as a way to 
control investment opportunities faced by firms. 
The cash flow variable is a proxy for a firm’s internal 
funds. If these are not important for investment 
decisions of a firm, the coefficient on the cash flow 
variable has no statistical significance. 
If the estimated coefficient for the variable change in 
working capital (WC) is negative, this is an indication 
that firms may face financial restrictions, as suggested 
by Fazzari and Petersen (1993). 
Given that the second main source of funds that a firm 
can access is debt, the variable change in medium- and 
long-term debt (LTD) was included to be taken into 
account the effect that debt might have on investment 
decisions. The existence of a positive relationship 
between variation in debt and investment expenses 
means that firms adjust their financial structure in such a 
way that allows them to accomplish their investment 
plans. 
 
ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
In this subsection we present the estimation results for 
the specifications of the investment equation adopted 
and for the various criteria used to split the sample. 
All equations were estimated using a fixed effects 
model, as proposed by Hsiao (2003). 
 
Full sample 
 
Table 5 shows the regression results for the econometric 
investment equation, considering the full sample. The 
following conclusions can be drawn from table 5: (a) all 
explanatory variables are significant at one per cent 
level, and the estimated coefficients have the sign 
indicated by theory; (b) there is a positive relationship 
between investment expenses and cash flow and 
between the change in the medium- and long-term debt, 
which suggests the importance of the financial structure 
of a firm on its investment decisions; and (c) there is a 
negative relationship between the two types of 
investment (fixed and working capital), which indicates 
that firms may face financing restrictions. 
 
Table 5 – Regression results for full sample. Dependent 
variable, It/kt-1. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
Number of observations 7140. 
Independent 
Variable 
Full 
sample 
Sit/Kit-1 0.026* 
(0.0013) 
CFit/ Kit-1 0.328* 
(0.0122) 
WCit/ Kit-1 -0.296* 
(0.0124) 
LTDit/ Kit-1 0.339* 
(0.0127) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.53 
DW 1.95 
* Significant at 1% level. 
 
Size 
Table 6 shows the regression results for the econometric 
investment equation, when the sample was divided 
according to firms’ size. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 6 – Regression results for firms classified 
according to their size. Dependent variable, It/kt-1. 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. Number of 
observations 3570. 
Independent 
Variable 
Large 
Firms 
Small 
Firms 
Sit/Kit-1 0.023* 
(0.0013) 
0.026* 
(0.0019) 
CFit/ Kit-1 0.234* 
(0.0123) 
0.468* 
(0.0183) 
WCit/ Kit-1 -0.219* 
(0.0113) 
-0.418* 
(0.0211) 
LTDit/ Kit-1 0.243* 
(0.0197) 
0.495* 
(0.0183) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.47 0.59 
DW 1.87 2.04 
* Significant at 1% level. 
 
The main features of the regression results shown in 
table 6 are the following. Firstly, although the estimated 
coefficients of the cash flow variable are statistically 
significant for both types of firms, the parameter for 
cash flow for small firms is twice the one for large firms. 
The results obtained indicate that an increase of one 
euro on cash flow of small firms leads to an increase of 
47 cents on their investment, whilst an identical increase 
in cash flow of large firms only increases investment on 
23 cents. 
Secondly, the results shown in table 6 confirm that 
investments in fixed assets and in working capital 
compete for the financing available, and that this effect 
is more important for small firms. 
Thirdly, there is a positive relationship between 
investment and variation in their medium- and long-term 
debt (ΔLTD). This means that, in order to undertake 
investment projects, firms adjust their financial 
structure. 
Finally, it is important to point out that although sales 
were included in the investment equation, cash flow 
becomes always statistically significant. This fact can be 
interpreted as an indication that cash flows themselves 
play a role in explaining investment expenses of firms, 
and they are not proxying for shifts in investment 
demand. 
 
Age 
 
Table 7 shows the regression results for the econometric 
investment equation when the sample was divided by 
age. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 – Regression results for firms classified 
according to their age. Dependent variable, It/kt-1. 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. Number of 
observations 3570. 
Independent 
Variable 
Mature 
Firms 
Young 
Firms 
Sit/Kit-1 0.028* 
(0.0012) 
0.023* 
(0.0018) 
CFit/ Kit-1 0.193* 
(0.0132) 
0.485* 
(0.0177) 
WCit/ Kit-1 -0.165* 
(0.0118) 
-0.456* 
(0.0181) 
LTDit/ Kit-1 0.200* 
(0.0129) 
0.514* 
(0.0179) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.42 0.65 
DW 1.89 2.03 
* Significant at 1% level. 
The following features are noteworthy. Firstly, given 
that the cash flow coefficient is higher for young firms 
than for mature firms, it can be argued that young firms 
tend to suffer more from finance constraints than mature 
firms. 
Secondly, this conclusion is enhanced by the behaviour 
of the variables investment in working capital (ΔWC) 
and change in medium- and long-term debt (ΔLTD). On 
one hand, the fact that both types of investment (in fixed 
and working capital) compete for the limited availability 
of funds for investment financing is confirmed and on 
other hand, there is a positive relationship between 
investment and change in medium- and long-term debt. 
Finally, since sales are statistically significant at one per 
cent level, this result confirms, on one hand, the 
importance of the accelerator principle as a determinant 
for investment expenses of firms and, on the other hand, 
the need to control the investment opportunities that 
firms face to evaluate the true impact of financial factors 
on the investment of companies. 
 
Retention ratio 
 
Table 8 shows the regression results for the econometric 
investment equation when the sample was divided by 
profits retention ratio. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 8 – Regression results for firms classified 
according to their retention practices. Dependent 
variable, It/kt-1. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
Number of observations 3570. 
Independent 
Variable 
Low 
Retention 
Firms 
High 
Retention 
Firms 
Sit/Kit-1 0.028* 
(0.0012) 
0.022* 
(0.0013) 
CFit/ Kit-1 0.180* 
(0.0113) 
0.588* 
(0.0186) 
WCit/ Kit-1 -0.171* 
(0.0110) 
-0.532* 
(0.0189) 
LTDit/ Kit-1 0.197* 
(0.0095) 
0.586* 
(0.0202) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.42 0.71 
DW 1.89 2.07 
* Significant at 1% level. 
This table shows that although the cash flow variable is 
statistically significant at a level of one per cent for both 
types of firms, the estimated coefficient is much higher 
for firms with high retention ratios (the difference 
between them reaches 0.408). This result is a clear 
indication that there are firms that face a finance 
hierarchy that can be explained by the existence of 
asymmetric information in financial markets. 
From table 8 it is also possible to conclude that: (a) the 
impact of investment in working capital (ΔWC) and of 
the change in medium- and long-term debt (ΔLTD) on 
investment is higher for high retention firms, and (b) 
sales are an important determinant of fixed capital 
investment of firms. 
 
Multicriteria 
 
In the previous subsections only one criterion was used 
each time to classify firms according to the information 
problems they face in financial markets. The same 
procedure has been adopted in the majority of the other 
studies on the investment cash flow relationship. 
However, as pointed out by Schiantarelli (1996), there is 
no reason not to use more than one criterion 
simultaneously to classify firms. 
Following this line of reasoning, the three criteria used 
previously were considered together to obtain empirical 
evidence about the link between the financial structure 
of a firm and its investment decisions. As such, the 
econometric investment equation was regressed for two 
groups of firms: one with the large, mature and low 
retention firms, and the other with the small, young and 
high retention firms. 
Table 9 shows the results of the regressions. As it can be 
seen in the table, the predictions of the financial 
restrictions model are clearly supported by the results 
obtained. In fact, the estimated coefficient for the cash 
flow variable is about ten times greater for small, young 
and high retention firms than for large, mature and low 
retention firms. 
 
Table 9 – Regression results for firms classified 
according to the three criteria simultaneously. 
Dependent variable, It/kt-1. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis. 
Independent 
Variable 
Large, Mature 
and Low 
Retention Firms 
Small, Young and 
High Retention 
Firms 
Sit/Kit-1 0.024* 
(0.0016) 
0.021* 
(0.0022) 
CFit/ Kit-1 0.064* 
(0.0074) 
0.652* 
(0.0318) 
WCit/ Kit-1 -0.064* 
(0.0055) 
-0.589* 
(0.0292) 
LTDit/ Kit-1 0.103* 
(0.0098) 
0.749* 
(0.0223) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.34 0.72 
DW 1.77 2.13 
Nº Obs. 1240 1160 
* Significant at 1% level. 
Moreover, the results indicate, also, that the small, 
young and high retention firms use in greater magnitude 
the working capital to smooth their fixed investment. 
This can be interpreted as an indication that these type 
of firms have more problems in obtaining external funds 
to finance their investment opportunities. 
Finally, small, young and high retention firms tend to 
adjust in higher magnitude its financial structure to 
accomplish their investment plans than large, mature and 
low retention firms. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
There has been in recent times a growing interest, from 
empirical researchers, in the study of the determinants of 
business fixed investment decisions. This interest can be 
justified by two main reasons. Firstly, investment is a 
very volatile component of GDP, which means that it 
can have a great influence over business cycles. 
Secondly, a new research topic about investment 
determinants (i.e., the role of financing constraints) was 
induced by recent developments in information 
economics. 
The aim of this paper was to apply these new theoretical 
developments to the case of the Portuguese 
manufacturing industry. In fact, two key hypotheses 
were tested. On one hand, financial factors are, apart 
from the real variables, important determinants of 
business fixed investment. On the other hand, the effect 
of financial factors is more important for firms that are, 
a priori, more exposed to information problems and, 
hence, where the severity of financial constraints is more 
acute. 
The findings of the empirical study confirm both 
hypotheses set in this study. In fact, the results obtained 
  
 
showed that financial factors have an impact on 
investment decisions of all firms, and that this influence  
is greater for those facing higher information problems 
in financial markets, such as: small, young and low 
retention firms. 
In terms of policy implications, the strong connection 
between firms’ financial status and investment, suggests 
that in the case, for example, of a restrictive monetary 
policy the real economy will be affected not only 
through the traditional channel of the cost of capital, but 
also through the availability of funds channel, which 
means that an increase in interest expenses of firms will 
reduce the availability of relatively cheap internal funds 
and increase the cost of external funds.  
Another important policy implication resulting from this 
study is the impact of tax policy changes. The main 
argument is that, when firms face limitations in 
obtaining finance due to imperfections in the financial 
markets, any increase in the tax revenue coming from 
tax charged to firms has a negative impact on 
investment, since it limits the availability of funds to 
which the company can access to achieve its investment 
plans. Therefore, it could be argued that tax policy 
measures such as the reduction in corporate tax rate, 
measures that disincentive high dividend payouts, 
accelerated depreciation allowances, and the 
introduction of an investment tax credit, could induce 
more investment in fixed capital by firms. 
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